On 19 th March 2009, several national newspapers in Austria reported on a "turbo scandal" that had been suspected on the Vienna Stock Exchange for several years. Concerned investors argued that the issuers of turbo certificates tried to raid the underlying prices of these down-and-out call options by selling underlyings with prices under the barriers, resulting in valueless turbos. The goal of this research is to find out which variables are crucial for the research, which stocks were manipulated and who their manipulators were. According to our empirical results, we define suspicious issuers for each stock and classify them as being highly, moderately, less suspicious or rather unsuspicious issuers.
Introduction
In this paper, we discuss the so-called "turbo scandal", an event that agitated the Austrian public in 2009 when information about the alleged manipulation of turbo certificates 1 on the Vienna Stock Exchange appeared. Investors claimed that some issuers of turbo certificates were pushing down the prices of underlying assets on purpose in order to break the barrier level of turbo certificates and in this way make them valueless. A turbo certificate is a financial derivative that belongs to a family of knockout barrier options. Its main characteristic is that it can provide high profits to investors if the underlying price moves far away from the barrier; on the contrary, it can become valueless if the underlying price goes below the barrier. The alleged scandal motivated small investors to organize a special union 2 in order to fight for their rights while the Financial Market Authority in Austria began to overcome the problem. Magazines and newspapers 3 also wrote about the issue; however, some years later, no scientific research, to our knowledge, has been published regarding this matter.
Market abuse incorporates insider dealings and price manipulation. There is no strict definition of market manipulation, so different authors give different definitions. Even the legal constitutions of some countries (e.g. the US, UK and EU) have been unsuccessful in precisely defining manipulation. US law prohibits manipulation but it leaves it to the courts to define on a case-by-case basis, whereas the UK and EU have proposed a principle-based description of prohibited manipulative practices (Kyle and Viswanathan, 2009 ). The US regulates market abuse and insider trading with the Securities Exchange Act of 1939, while the EU put into force Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation. This was a pioneer text that was amended to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID1) whose goal was to encompass new changes on rapidly developing financial markets. Nevertheless, in October 2011 the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal for the revision of MiFID1 1 Turbo certificates are barrier options that are specific to financial markets in the German speaking area. They belong to the so-called Hebelzertifik ate (Hebel ger. Leverage). As with other leverage derivatives, it is possible for the investor to earn or lose overproportionally. 2 Concerned investors organized thems elves into a union, in German called V erein für Finanzmark tausgleich. 3 Many Austrian newspapers published articles about the issue e. g.
http://www.fondsprofessionell.at/news/aktuelle-news/?t x_fp_pi1[n id]=957346, http://aktienportal.at/shownews.html?id=17870, http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/international/462677/Markt manipulation -beiTurbozertifikaten?fro m=gl.ho me.wirtschaft_International, http://derstandard.at/1237227827340/ Verein-fuerFinanzmarktausgleich-Anlegerverein-wittert-Tu rbo-Skandal, http://www.oe24.at/wirtschaft/Anleger-wollenFinanzaufsicht-klagen/422857.
(referred to as MiFID2). This newest proposal was designed to take into account technical developments in the trading environment.
Since the turbo scandal belongs to trade-based manipulation, its main characteristic is that actors try to manipulate stock prices using different trading strategies. According to the statement by concerned investors, the issuers of turbo certificates tried to crash down the underlying price by making best selling orders with prices under the barrier or by making limited selling orders when the market is deep. These orders were sufficient to break the barrier of turbo certificates. Investors further stated that trading actions were also carried out when the market was thin or during certain parts of the day, such as lunchtime and morning coffee break, when manipulators had enough "privacy" to conduct manipulation activities. Moreover, to hedge the possible risk in long turbo certificates that might occur due to a rise in the underlyings' prices, issuers used to keep a sufficient amount of stocks underlying these turbo certificates in their portfolios. We later build the hypotheses for the present research according to these statements on the turbo scandal case.
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Since this research examines trade-based manipulation, a short insight into the literature on this type of manipulation is now given. Several studies investigate closing price manipulation because of the wide usage of closing price as a benchmark in praxis as well as in science. Kumar and Seppi (1992) construct examples of equilibrium manipulation in the context of a modified Kyle (1985) model, while Hillion and Souminen (2004) are intrigued by the last minute trading on the Paris Bourse, which was the most traded period during the day before call auction was introduced. They use an agency-based model of closing price manipulation and show that closing call auctions decrease manipulation.
Several papers develop models by which they try to prove or at least indicate market manipulation. Some of the pioneer working papers that build models include Hart (1977) , Kyle (1985) , Jarrow (1994) and Allen and Gale (1992) . In recent times, studies of underlying prices on option expiration dates have appeared. For example, Stoll and Whaley (1991) and Ni et al. (2005) find positive evidence that stock prices change their behavior on expiration dates , indicating that one of the main reasons for clustering is stock price manipulation by investors. Gallagher et al. (2009) find evidence that managers with low performing results are keener to engage in manipulative trading strategies than high performing managers.
Studies of prosecuted manipulation cases are rare. Aggarwal and Wu (2006) research the cases prosecuted by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). They note that stock prices were increasing during the manipulation period but decreasing in the post-manipulation period. Another study that examines prosecuted cases by the SEC is that by Comerton-Forde and Putninš (2011) . Their sample shows that manipulation is mostly driven by managers, brokers and larger shareholders. In their research, they develop an index that can be broadly used across different markets for the detection of price manipulation.
In this paper, we investigate stocks for which concerned investors state that significant suspicion exists about possible manipulation. To verify whether there might be scientific proof or at least an indication of market abuse and price manipulation we pursue our research based on daily and intraday analyses.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and data. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework and research tools. Section 4 analyses the results and gives explanations, while Section 5 concludes.
Methodology and Data

Methodology
The main idea of our research is that there exists a suspicion about price manipulation when the price or trading volume 5 of the underlying is outside its confidence intervals. We call these days alarm days. Therefore, we investigate knocked out turbo certificates (KO turbos hereafter) and their issuers on days with and without price or volume alarms. We deem that if the knocking out of turbo certificates ( Figure 1 ) were performed on purpose, then crashing down the price would probably lead to the triggering of a price alarm on the down limit. This means that the number of KO turbos per day would be larger on days when there is a price alarm on the down limit than when there is no price alarm. Further, we want to see whether the knockout of turbo certificates (KO event hereafter) is correlated with volume; in other words, whether the KO event was performed more on days when the traded volume was small i.e. when the market was thinner when it was large. Finally, price manipulation is assumed to have been carried out by those issuers who have an overproportional share of KO turbos on alarm days.
Figure 1
We base our methodology for constructing the confidence intervals for daily price and volume (in units) movements on Minenna (2003) . We use Ornstein-Uhlenbeck as the underlying price process with an estimation window of 15 days and a 99% confidence level. For volume, we take the Geometric Brownian Motion instead of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck as the underlying process with an estimation window of 15 days and a confidence level of 95%.
If the stock price on a certain day touches or goes beneath the down limit of the confidence interval, an alarm on the down limit will be triggered; by contrast, if it touches or goes above the upper limit, an alarm on the upper limit will be triggered.
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Since we investigate only long turbo certificates, we concentrate our research only on the down limit of the confidence interval for price movement and consequently divide the space for price movement into two parts: (i) a price alarm on the down limit and (ii) no price alarm on the down limit. The latter comprises the space between the two limits of the confidence interval and the space above the upper limit of the confidence interval. The space within the limits of the confidence intervals for volume are divided into three parts: (i) volume alarm on the down limit (ii) no volume alarm and (iii) volume alarm on the upper limit.
Since no useable software already exists, all the research from confidence intervals to three-way contingency tables, volatility measures, continuous returns and various key figures are programmed in Matlab 6 . Hypotheses are tested according to categorical data analysis in SPSS, which is pursued on daily and intraday results obtained from the programmed software. The categorical data analysis includes loglinear modeling, association and symmetric measures for two-and threedimensional contingency tables. 7 We apply the Chi-square test of independence and the Chi-square test of homogeneity on two-and three-way tables to see which of the investigated variables are dependent and which are independent or irrelevant for further research. European Land, Raiffeisen Bank Int., RHI, Verbund, Voestalpine and Wienerberger. Both daily analyses are pursed on all 12 stocks, while the intraday analysis is not pursued on the Meinl European Land stock due to missing tick data. Table 1 shows the number of turbo certificates divided by stock, issuer and analysis period. Table 1 
Theoretical Background and Tools for the Analysis
Our external forensic financial research is divided into three major parts : two daily analyses and one intraday analysis. Daily analyses are based on the characteristics of KO turbo days, i.e. whether there is a price and/or volume alarm on a certain day, how many KO turbos are knocked out per day, who is the issuer of KO turbos and whether this KO turbo is that with the minimal barrier of a day. The intraday analysis is based on tick data and the investigation of only those KO turbos whose barriers are the minimal barriers on KO turbo days.
We base our analysis on Minenna (2003), who suggests that price and volume alarms both be checked when searching for market abuse due to the possible interactions between these two variables. Oscillations in prices and trading volumes outside the predicted confidence intervals are the first step to checking for market abuse.
Daily Analysis I: Day Counts
Analysis I has two goals. The first is to find out which variables among the price alarm, volume alarm and number of KO turbos per day are significant for the research and their relations. The second is to find out which of the 12 stocks were indeed manipulated in the period from January 2 nd 2007 until December 31 st 2010.
Analysis I is based on the characterization of the days in the period of investigation for all 12 stocks according to the following characteristics:
(i) variable A: whether there is a KO turbo on that day (no, yes),
(ii) variable B: whether there is a price alarm on the down limit on that day (no, yes) and (iii) variable C: whether there is a volume alarm on that day (no, yes on the upper limit, yes on the down limit).
For each day, our algorithm counts how many turbo certificates are knocked out and classifies that day as a day with no KO turbos or with one, two, three, four or five or more KO turbos (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and ≥ 5).
In this way, seven types of contingency tables are constructed: two threedimensional tables and five two-dimensional tables. The three-dimensional tables 6 have as their variables the number of KO turbos (variable A), price alarm (variable B) and volume alarm (variable C). Variable A is combined i n two ways. One way is that it has all six outcomes (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ≥ 5) and the other way that it has only two outcomes, namely the days on which there are no KO turbos and days on which there are one or more KO turbos (0, ≥ 1). We apply loglinear analysis to the threedimensional tables to assess the interactions between variables A, B and C. 8 Further,
we apply the Chi-square test of independence on the two-and three-way tables to calculate the directional and symmetrical measures 9 about which we discuss
Cramer's V due to its wide applicability.
For the two-dimensional tables, a Chi-square test of independence is used in order to see whether the two variables A*B, A*C or B*C are independent when there is no third variable checking for the existence of the Simpson Paradox. The most significant results are obtained for the combination of variables A and B. These tables show for all manipulable stocks that the number of days on which there is a price alarm on the down limit and on which there is at least one KO turbo per day is much higher than what it should be in the case of independence. This type of table is discussed in Section 4.
Further, to find out which of the stocks were indeed manipulated we first calculate the conditional probabilities that when there is a KO turbo on a certain day that then there is also a price alarm on the down limit on that day. We calculate the conditional probability P(Alarm/KO) for each stock and compare this with the conditional probability P(Alarm/KO) for the remaining stocks. For this, we use the z test of equality between two proportions on the down limit over the Bayesian statistics calculated for the A and B variable combination. This variable combination is crucial for detecting manipulated stocks because it can affirm or disapprove the allegation that turbo certificates were knocked out on purpose (see Section 1). In other words, the crashing down of underlying prices would most probably have triggered a price alarm on the down limit and thus the occurrence of these two variables together by a certain stock implies that the stock was manipulated. The suspicion of being manipulated is given to those stocks whose P(Alarm/KO) 10 is significantly higher than the P(Alarm/KO) of the remaining stocks together.
Analysis II: KO Turbo Counts
Our second analysis also tackles the days in the period 2 nd January 2007 until 31 st December 2010 but with different variable combinations. This time, we characterize days according to: (i) the issuer of KO turbo, (ii) whether the KO turbo represents the KO turbo with the minimal barrier on a KO turbo day (no, yes) (iii) and whether there is a price alarm on the down limit on that KO turbo day (no, yes). For 7 each category, the number of KO turbos is counted. For this purpose another algorithm in Matlab was programmed in order to construct three -way contingency tables and to process the data obtained by the first algorithm for confidence intervals.
The second analysis aims to identify the suspicious issuers for each underlying. In order to identify suspicious issuers, we apply the Chi-square test of homogeneity to our KO turbo count tables. To be able to do that, we define our two variables, namely minimal barrier and a price alarm on the down limit, as one variable but with four outcomes 11 , that is, we make two-dimensional tables out of the threedimensional tables. After applying the Chi-square test to the KO turbo counts table, we check whether it is homogeneous at the 5% and 1% significance levels. If the table is heterogeneous, we identify suspicious issuers in it and eliminate them from the table until it reaches homogeneity. We then define a positive deviation as the percentage between the observed and expected frequencies in the variable combination -a price alarm on the down limit and KO turbo is the KO turbo with the minimal barrier on the KO turbo day -as the key factor for identifying suspicious issuers. We call this factor the elimination measure. Issuers with a positive elimination measure are step-wisely eliminated from the table until the table reaches homogeneity. The elimination process starts with the highest positive elimination measure and ends with the lowest one. In other words, the above-mentioned variable combination is the key factor in discovering real suspected issuers , because we suppose that those issuers who wanted to knock out turbo certificates on purpose were probably interested in knocking out those turbo certificates with the minimal barrier on that particular day. Reaching the price level of the minimal barrier enables issuers to knock out at once all other turbo certificates whose barriers are higher than the minimal one or. In other words, issuers receive the so-called "cascade" knocking out in which dozens of turbo certificates can be knocked out in just one step.
Analysis III: Intraday Event Study
Analysis III is divided into two parts: (i) key figures and (ii) histograms. In the following section, we provide an overview of the methods used to find the results.
Key Figures
The third part of the empirical investigation is based on tick data for the period 2 nd January 2007 until 28 th November 2008, for which we conducted an event study.
All intraday data are analyzed for each underlying, separately for alarm days and non-alarm days and for each issuer. We base our event study on Bommel and Rossetto (2009). For each knockout day, separately for alarm days and non-alarm days, an event window of six hours is calculated for each KO turbo, which is the KO turbo with the minimal barrier on the KO turbo day. 12 For each second three hours before and three hours after the KO event, a price index and a volume index are calculated and analyzed. Since we use order-based tick data, first we have to transform them into second-based ticks. In order to do that, we build a 21,600-space vector and split it into two parts: -10,800 seconds to the left representing three hours before the KO event and +10,800 seconds to the right representing three hours after the KO event. The standardized event second 0 is split into 0 -, 0 and 0 + , resulting in 21,603 spaces. For each second, we calculate the price and volume indices and normalize them with the price of the knockout order (KO price) and size of the knockout order (KO order size) to ascertain a normalized KO price at 100 EUR and a normalized KO volume at 1 unit. In order to aggregate KO turbos according to certain characteristics i.e. for each stock and for each issuer, separately for alarm days and non-alarm days and for both of these variants together, we place 21,603-space vectors of each KO turbo one upon the other and calculate the mean and standard deviation through each second. Since not every second in a 21,603-space vector has an index, we apply linear interpolation to connect empty spaces. We define the mean reverting behavior of the price movement after the KO event as a sign that the knockout was forced by price manipulation, whereas its absence signals no manipulation activity. Reversion Ratio (ln Price Index max(t,t+3h) /100)). We apply Welch's test of equality between the two means to test these key figures.
As testing groups for each stock, we define the following combinations: (i) each issuer against all other issuers for non-alarm days, (ii) each issuer against all other issuers for alarm days and (iii) each issuer against all other issuers for alarm days compared with non-alarm days. We also calculate the mean for all issuers together for each type of day in order to see which particular issuer deviates upwards from the mean of the group. We concentrate our analysis on choosing the representative key figures on the mean of the group and not on the statistical significance obtained by Welch's test statistics. This is due to the very high standard deviations i.e. very small sample sizes s 1 .
14 The most intriguing results are obtained for the key figure mean reversion, which is thoroughly analyzed in Section 4.
Further, we search for the 10 KO turbos with the highest mean reversion rates among the KO turbos with minimal barriers on KO turbo days. These 10 turbo event, we shortened the event window for that KO turbo until the opening/closing of the stock exchange. 13 O, L, H and C are symbols for open, low, high and close prices. 14 Here, s 1 represents samples containing KO turbos with minimal barriers on KO turbo days issued only by one particular issuer. Very often, samples s 1 contain fewer than five KO turbos, which leads to wide confidence intervals and consequently to no rejection of H 0.
certificates form the Top Ten Tables, which represent single outliers on each stock among all KO turbos with the minimal barrier issued on a particular stock.
Histograms of Times of Death
According to the concerned investors, one more statement about knocking out turbo certificates must be checked. These investors assert that knocking out used to be performed at specific parts of the day. In order to check this allegation, we build histograms for the exact KO times of death of KO turbos with minimal barriers on KO turbo days for each stock. We do this for all issuers together, for each issuer separately and for days when a price alarm is on the down limit and when it is not. We then apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test in order to see if there exists significant differences in the distribution of KO times of death between the above-mentioned groups (see Section 3.3.1.).
Empirical Results
In the following subsections, the results of Analysis I explain which variables are the most important for further research and how they interact. Further, we explain how manipulated stocks are identified by using a z test of equality between two proportions based on the 2×2 table results from Analysis I. Moreover, we show stepwisely how the suspicious issuers for each stock are detected from the results of Analysis II and Analysis III and provide a graphical presentation of the key figure mean reversion as well as the histograms for the KO time of death of KO turbos.
Searching for the Relevant Variables
In almost all table combinations, variable C is insignificant, which can be seen by low Cramer's V values in the two-way tables of the variable combinations A*C and B*C. By contrast, in the three-dimensional tables it is either jointly independent of variable A (the loglinear model is AB, C) or it is only conditionally dependent on variable A through variable B (the loglinear model is then AB, AC). As we can see, variable C does not influence KO turbos. For the three-dimensional tables, the p value for the likelihood ratio is provided to describe how well the model fits the data.
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Loglinear model class, likelihood ratio, p value and test of independence for the three-way tables as well as Pearson's Chi-square, Cramer's V, p value and test of independence for two-way tables are all given in Table 2 . The association between variables A and B is confirmed by the test of independence, which clearly shows that dependence between these two variables exists for all stocks and is significant at the 1% level. It can be noted that Cramer's V is very high in the 2×2 tables for the variable combination A*B and that for some stocks it reaches values > 0.55 (e.g. Bwin 0.62, Erste Group Bank 0.56, Raiffeisen Bank Int. 0.59 and Verbund 0.59). This shows that the interaction between the days when a price alarm is on the down limit and when there is at least one KO turbo is significantly strong. It is also noted that Cramer's V 16 is always higher when variable A is in its extended version, namely when the days with the number of KO turbos per day are counted. This means that variables A and B are positively associated. Table 2 As mentioned in Section 3, the most striking results among our seven types of contingency tables were obtained in the 2×2 tables for the A and B variable combination. Therefore, we analyze this type of table in more detail for Bwin. The Chi-square statistics for all stocks in the 2×2 table design are presented in Table 2 . For the 5% and 1% significance levels and 1 df, the theoretical values of the Chisquare distribution are 3.84 and 6.63, respectively, which are both much smaller than the empirical value of 263.33 for Bwin. Table 3 shows the observed and expected frequencies and their deviation in percentages for the Bwin stock. If we look at the crucial variable combination, namely when the number of KO turbos is at least one and there is a price alarm on the down limit, we notice that the observed frequency is 79, meaning there are 79 days when there is at least one KO turbo per day and when there is a price alarm on the down limit on the same day. However, there should be only 19 days in this variable combination, or expressed in percentages, there are 324% more such days than what it should be. This percentage is far higher than it is in other variable combinations, which is an indication that it could no t have happened by chance. Our explanation for this result supports the allegation of the concerned investors that the knocking out of KO turbos was performed on purpose by crashing down the prices, which then triggered an alarm price on the down limit. However, rather than evidence, this is only a strong indication of price manipulation. Table 3 Further, variable C has to be analyzed with variables A and B separately. Regarding the interaction between variables A and C, the test of independence shows that these two variables are statistically dependent only in some cases. Very often, Cramer's V stays low, mostly around 0.1, meaning that the interaction between variables A and C is weak. Moreover, for the variable combination B*C, Cramer's V also remains very low, mostly < 0.2, which denotes that price and volume alarms are also weakly associated, although the test of independence does show statistical significance at 1% for some stocks. Since variable C is not a key variable in connection with variable A, it is excluded from Analyses II and III.
Searching for Manipulated Stocks
The results of the z test of equality between the two proportions are shown in Table 4 . The null hypothesis asserts that the conditional probability (P(Alarm/KO)) of 16 A concise overview of the effect sizes of association measures can be found in Cohen (1998 
Searching for Suspicious Issuers
In this subsection, we summarize the results of Analysis II and Analysis III in order to ascertain conclusive results regarding suspicious issuers for Bwin. The results for other suspicious underlyings are presented at the end of this subsection.
Before beginning with the numerical analysis of each suspicious issuer, we look at the graphical presentation of the average mean reversion rate of all KO turbos with minimal barriers for all issuers together on days when a price alarm is on the down limit for the Bwin stock. At first glance, the mean reversion rate in the period three hours after the KO event reaches the same level as it had three hours before, which is an indication that price manipulation happened. Moreover, the lower part of the Figure 2 shows that the KO event was triggered by very small order sizes, whereas in the time interval three hours before and three hours after order sizes were much higher, which shows that price manipulation was mostly performed with ver y small orders. Figure 2 At this point, we also look at the histograms containing the exact KO time of death for the Bwin stock. According to the concerned investors, KO events used to happen at particular times of the day. However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test does not show any significant difference in the distribution of the KO times of death. This is due to the very small samples s 1 of a particular issuer. Because the KolmogorovSmirnoff or any other statistical test loses test power, it is not possible to examine the KO times of death. However, a visual inspection of the histograms (Figure 3) shows that on days when a price alarm is on the down limit there is a larger accumulation of KO turbos at the beginning of the day from 9:15 until 9:45 a.m. and at the end of the working day from 4:45 until 5 p.m. Table 5a contains the observed and expected frequencies and elimination measures for the Bwin stock, while Table 5b contains the Chi-squares statistics and critical values at a 95% confidence level. The Chi-square statistics for the Bwin stock is 46.14, whereas the critical value is 36.42, meaning that the table is heterogeneous.
Issuers under the codes 432, 581, 803 and 525 have positive elimination measures, which defines them as suspicious issuers in the first step of the analysis. Table 5 Issuer 432 Issuer 432 has the highest elimination measure, i.e. a positive deviation of 72%, and thus it is first to be eliminated from Table 5a . In other words, the number of KO turbos in the variable combination a price alarm on the down limit (yes) and KO turbo is the turbo with the minimal barrier on the KO turbo day (yes) for issuer 432 is 7 even though it should only be 4 17 . After the elimination of issuer 432, the Chisquare statistics declines to 43.56 (Table 5b ), but this is still not enough for the table to reach homogeneity because the critical value fell to 32.67
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. The next step is to see whether the Bwin stock has a significant mean reversion rate. Table 6 contains the average values of the mean reversion rates for all KO turbos with minimal barriers issued by one specific issuer and the p values resulting from Welch's test combinations. Issuer 432 also has a very high mean reversion rate of 7.16% on KO turbo days when a price alarm is on the down limit. Although this is not significantly different from the average mean reversion rate of the remaining issuers, it is much higher than the average mean reversion rate of all issuers together (4.75%). This issuer is also twice a single outlier (Table 7) with 16.1% and 10.2% single mean reversion rates. Owing to the highest elimination measure, a very high average mean reversion rate on KO turbo days when a price alarm is on the down limit and two outliers in Table 7 , we define issuer 432 as highly suspicious. Table 6   Table 7 Following the numerical part of the analysis for issuer 432, we present a graphical presentation (Figure 4 ) of the average mean reversion rate and standard deviation for KO turbos with minimal barriers on days when a price alarm is on the down limit. Figure 4 Issuer 581
In the next step, issuer 581 has to be eliminated because it has the second highest elimination measure of 36%. The observed number of KO turbos in the above-mentioned variable combination is 7, whereas the expected number of KO 17 The expected frequencies of KO turbos are always rounded up to the nearest integer since the turbo certificate cannot be in a decimal form. 18 After t he elimination of an issuer, the df of the table change bec ause each issuer represents one row in the contingency table. In order not to lose possible suspicious issuers, we state that the expected frequency in each cell must be larger than 3 (f e > 3) in order to be accountable in the Chisquare test calculation. turbos is only 5. The Chi-square statistics declines to 38.80, but the table has still not reached homogeneity because the critical value is 28.86. The second suspicious issuer from Analysis II is issuer 581. Howe ver, this issuer does not have significant average mean reversion rates nor are those rates higher than the average mean reversion rates of all issuers together. Further, it has no KO turbo outlier in Table 7 . Therefore, we define issuer 581 as rather unsuspicious.
Issuer 803
Further, we eliminate the issuer with the third highest elimination measure of 32%, i.e. issuer 803. This issuer has mean reversion rates of 1.80% on days when there is no price alarm and of 3.64% on days when there is a price alarm. These are both lower than the average mean reversion rates on these days (2.52% and 4.75%, respectively). However, this issuer appears twice in Table 7 with 8.3% and 7.3% single outlier rates. According to these facts, we define issuer 803 as moderately suspicious. Further, after the elimination of issuer 803, the Chi-square statistics of the table falls to 30.36, which is still not enough to reach homogeneity because the critical value is now only 25.00 , implying that the elimination process has to be continued.
Although the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test did not reach statistical significance, some patterns in the distribution of the KO times of death can be noted. For issuer 803, most knockouts happened in the periods 9:30-9:45 a.m. and 10:30-l 10:45 a.m., while about 15% happened in the periods 3:30-4 p.m. and about 7.5% in 4:45-5:15 p.m., which is more than in the same time periods for all issuers together ( Figure 5 ). With the exception of the beginning of the day, where the percentage of the KO times of death reaches about 23% until 9:45 a.m., the KO times of death remain equally distributed during the rest of the day with a percentage of about 4% in almost each quarter of an hour.
Issuer 525
We are now left with the last suspicious issuer from Analysis II, namely issuer 525, which has the fourth highest elimination measure. Similar to issuer 803, this issuer has no statistically significant mean reversion rates, having 2.37% on KO turbo days when there is no price alarm and 4.18% on KO turbo days when there is a price alarm (these are lower than the average mean reversion rates for the group of 2.52% and 4.75%). Issuer 525 also appears twice in Table 7 with 18.5% and 11.9% single mean reversion rates. Accordingly, we classify issuer 525 as moderately suspicious.
However, we must make a slight distinction between issuers 803 and 525. Although they both have similar general characteristics, issuer 525 has higher mean reversion rates (2.37% and 4.18%) than issuer 803 (1.80% and 3.64%). The same pattern can be noted in Table 7 , where issuer 525 has much higher single outliers (18.5% and 11.9%) than issuer 803 (8.3% and 7.3%). Owing to these differences between issuers 803 and 525, we characterize issuer 525 as more suspicious than issuer 803, although both of them are moderately suspicious. Finally, after the elimination of issuer 525 from Table 5a, the table reaches Issuer 613
Although issuer 613 was not found to be suspicious in Analysis II, it has however the highest mean reversion rates among all issuers (5.05% on KO turbo days when there is no price alarm on the down limit and 7.25% on KO turbo days when there is a price alarm on the down limit). The rate of 5.05% is significantly different at the 5% significance level from the mean reversion rate of the rest of the issuers in the group on days when there is no price alarm. Issuer 613 also has one outlier in Table 7 of 6.9%. These characteristics define issuer 613 as moderately suspicious.
To summarize, the suspicious issuers from Analyses II and III on the Bwin stock are 432, which we find to be highly suspicious, and 525, 803 and 613, which are moderately suspicious. Issuer 581 is rather unsuspicious. Regarding the rest of the issuers 225, 371, 438, 584 and 901, we conclude that they are not suspicious because they show no suspicion in Analyses II and III.
The same procedure was carried out for the other eight stocks. The results are shown in Table 8 . It is clear that some issuers show up as more suspicious than others. Issuer 225 is recognized as highly suspicious twice, as moderately suspicious three times and as rather unsuspicious once. Issuer 432 is rated as highly suspicious, moderately suspicious and rather unsuspicious twice each. Issuer 581 is suspicious and highly suspicious once each and rather unsuspicious three times. Further, issuer 371 is classified as being highly suspicious once, moderately suspicious once and less suspicious twice. Issuers 803, 525 and 613 are classified as moderately suspicious as their highest levels of suspiciousness. Issuer 803 shows up as rather unsuspicious once. Issuer 525 is rated as moderately suspicious, less suspicious and rather unsuspicious twice each. Furthermore, issuer 613 is classified as moderately suspicious once and rather unsuspicious twice Finally, issuer 438 is found to be less suspicious once and rather unsuspicious twice. Table 8 
Conclusion
Based upon the asserted turbo scandal case at the Vienna Stock Exchange, we set up and test models and hypotheses using different mathematical and statistical methods. We divide our research into three parts: two daily analyses and one intraday analysis. First, we investigate which variables are crucial for the research and find out that a KO event is connected to a price alarm, whereas a volume alarm, in most cases, is irrelevant. Further, the second analysis incorporates the search for actually manipulated stocks. By applying the z test of equality between two proportions, we find that eight out of 12 stocks mentioned in the statement of the Verein fur Finanzmarktausgleich were indeed manipulated. In the second analysis, we use the Chi-square test of homogeneity in combination with an elimination measure to detect suspicious issuers from contingency tables. Moreover, the intraday analysis shows the investigation of price and volume indices upon which we construct key figures. The most striking results are derived by the key figure maximal mean reversion rate in the period three hours after the KO event. Another important key figure, which also supported detecting suspicious issuers, is the proportion of KO Order Size to the Average Order Size of the Day. For some stocks, especially for particular issuers, this figure fully supports the rumors that turbo certificates have been knocked out by very small order sizes. However, we do not find either evidence or indications that knocking out was performed at specific times of day.
Our results deliver strong indications that there exists reasonable suspiciousness that in the period 2 nd January 2007 until 31 st December 2010 on the Vienna Stock Exchange price manipulation was performed on certain stocks by crashing down their prices in order to knock out turbo certificates. Further, this research makes two important contributions. The first one is to the scientific literature because papers on price manipulation based on empirical cases are rare and tend to tackle the problem of price manipulation using different methodologies. The second one is to the financial market authorities because the methodology we suggest in our work for detecting manipulated underlyings and supposed manipulators is applicable to all financial markets. Note: The upper part of this figure shows the average mean reversion rate of K O turbos wit h the minimal barrier of the day issued by issuer 432. Although this issuer has the highest mean reversion rate among all issuers on t he B win stock (at the point +3h, it reac hes almost 107 EUR), its volume pattern is not that clear and thus we cannot conclude that issuer 432 performed manipulation by very small order sizes.
Figure 5: Relative frequencies of the KO times of death between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. on the Bwin stock, issuer 803, price alarm days.
